NEW DIMENSIONS TO SECURITY INSIDE THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT GLOBAL CHALLENGES

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Abstract: *The European Union concept has evolved over the years from an economical platform for European countries, to that of a social and political structure. With new borders in the Western Balkans and with evolving challenges and threats in the form of inter-dependency, illegal immigration or pandemic outbreaks the EU has adopted unprecedented security policies. It is the aim of this paper to present current and future solution that the EU has to implement in terms of security in order to maintain its current status as a multidimensional structure that integrates 27 European Countries while playing a global role in major fields like economy, security and geo-politics. For this paper we have opted to use the descriptive method, trying to analyze data from European documentation (treaties, policies) and by doing so understanding what are the ways ahead, that the EU wants to follow in terms of security and defense.*

Keywords: security, inter-dependency, immigration, economic growth

1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Common Security and Defense Policy has been developed following the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Union has undertaken more actions in terms of security and defense. Some member states have argued whether bringing a new security role for the EU is necessary considering that most member states of the EU are also members of the NATO organization and NATO has been ever since its conception one of the major organizations that has dealt with security objectives inside the European continent. The aim of this paper is to present where the EU can be complementary to NATO efforts in defense and what support can EU bring in means of security and defense in a world where challenges and threats have changed and evolved. For this reason the paper is organized in three chapters. In the first chapter we want to analyze what the implementations of the CSDP has actually meant for the development of the European Union role in defense,. In the second chapter we want to present the differences and similarities that NATO and EU share and what can be some of the inputs that the EU can bring to the table in matters of security when communicating with NATO while not duplicating effort for member states that are part of both organizations while finally the third chapter is trying to look at different challenges, risks and threats that are emerging inside the EU like immigration, border control, pandemic and biological threats, etc. At the end of the paper a series of conclusions and ways ahead will be proposed.

In the following chapters we are going to use the descriptive research methodology, by analyzing several European Union documents, policies and treaties oriented towards matters of security, foreign affairs and defense.

2. SECURITY INSIDE THE EU

2.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy. Even though we have already mentioned the Common Security and Defense Policy as a document that enables the European Union to undergo actions in security and defense it must be mentioned that before the CSDP the document that established a role for the EU in terms of Security has been The Common Foreign and Security Policy.

This Policy has been implemented ever since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, when the European Union has started to be organized under a three pillar system as it can be seen in Figure1**.**

The European Political Cooperation Act from 1970 seemed insuficient for the EU to work on strenghtening relationship between member states heading into the 90s and the Yugoslavic War made

it clear the European Union would also need to strenthen its foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty brought in three new pillars.

Fig. 1 The Three Pillars of the EU
Source: Pillars_of_the_European_Union.svg

The first pillar was The European Community in itself, which meant the development of several objectives such as:

1. The single market
2. Democratization of the Institutions
3. European Citizenship
4. Economic and Monetary Union which would also mean the development of suveral other objectives like the development of single currency, a European Central Bank, single monetary policy and coordination of economic policies.

Another Pillar was that of Justice and Home Affairs with emphasis on closer cooperation in this particular field between member states. The third pillar was that of The Common Forreing and Security Policy which would enhance the ideea of an eventual common defense policy. Defense and Security were strenghten in the CFSP under the Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon that followeed. Even though the Three Pillar System ended in 2009 in Lisbon, the security challange was not passed besides as a under the Treaty of Lisbon a position for a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was created together with a new Defense Orientated Strategy that would become the Common Security and Defense Policy. Thus the peremises were created over a period of almost twenty years for the EU to have a major role in issues of defense.

2.2 The Common Security and Defense Policy. As part of the Common Foreign and Security Poliicy, the CSDP became the European Union's main course of action in the field of defense and crisis management.

The CSDP has meant a leap for the European Union in terms for the European Defense Industry, for developing and External Action Service's Management and Planning Directorate and for developing four separate agenices including the European Defense Agency.

Perhaps one of the most important steps realized by the CSDP has been the development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation also known as PESCO in which 25 member states of the EU purse the structural integration of their national armed forces.

Even though it was elaborated starting tiwh 2009, the CSDP wasn't really put into action untill June 2016 when the document entitled: *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy' (EUGS) for 2016*.was presented to the European Council.

The EUGS document identified five set of priorities for EU foreign policy:

1. the security of the Union;
2. state and societal resilience to the East and South of the EU;
3. the development of an integrated approach to conflicts;
4. cooperative regional orders;
5. global governance for the 21st century.

Of course the EUGS is a document that is review yearly in order to improve and update the needs of the member states.

In the same year, 2016, the European Union through its member states reiterated its intention in strenghen EU cooperation on matters of external security and defense.

The first initiative that followed was the act called: Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, a document that make the previous objectives of the CSDP operational under the vivison of the EUGS.

Furthermore a European Defense Action Plan was presented to the European Council that would also establish the development of a European Defense Fund. An European Defense Fund would be on of the controversial ideas presented inside the CSDP as several member states of the EU are allready contributing to the NATO defense fund called NDPP. In the following chapter of this paper we will analize wether the two funds can be correlated or whether they create a duplycating effort for those states that are members of both organizations.

As a conclusion to the steps undertaken by the EU in terms of security and defense with the help

of the CSDP, by 2017 a Military Planning and Conduct Capability structure was developed that would increase the European Union capacity to execute military missions.

In 2018, the PESCO initative presented earlier also started to be implemented.

3. THE EU AND NATO

3.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy. In terms of resolving security issues there are two ideologies inside the EU. The first one, the so called Carolingian Europe sustains that the EU should develop its own military sphere, so as to be able to independently conduct a full range of military missions. For such a possibility, member states should increase their own military capabilities, national defense industries, and military education schools and academies

The Atlantists base their ideology on the fact that Europe already shares a military organization in the form of NATO. Furthermore investing in another organization in matters of defense would only duplicate efforts from member states and would be a waste of resources. Their argument is that such an investment would also weaken the existing transatlantic link that has played a major role following the end of the Second World War and has allowed Europe to develop from an economical point of view.

Before the existence of the CFSP and CSDP there have been other documentes linking NATO and EU. An initial agreement between the two organization was reached during the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin and created the basis for all future treaties.

The agreement was entitled: the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and it was based on the idea of «divisible, but not divided» forces. Based on this principle there were gonna be s structures and units belonging partialy to NATO with European personnel that could also be used by the EU to respond to particular crisis that the European Union wanted to handle and did not involve NATO.

The treaty allowed the creation of a two tier system in which NATO had the first option to respond to a crisis and if the organization did not chose to actm than the CJTF forces could be used by the European Union for its own actions. Thourgh this agreement, for the first time in history the EU shifted from being just a soft power to being a hard power equiped with militay capiblities and having its own planning staff. Of course, the agreement would see to it that no

duplication of efforts would happen between the two organizations. From the Carolingian ideology point of view, the only setback was that the European Union woud take a back sit in this agreement, as NATO would be the organization deciding whether or not it would act first.

Just two years after the agreements were implemented in 1996, in 1998 the United Kingdom and France published the Saint-Malo Declaration for an integrated European military force. The United States took awarness of the document and ir responded by insisting that such a military integration would have to follow three principle in accordance to a future collaboration to NATO, and that would become the Three Ds principles which are in order:

- no *duplication* of structures that already existed within NATO;
- no *discrimination* of NATO members that were not EU members;
- no *decoupling* of the transatlantic link.

These ideas were taken and implemented in the NATO Summit held in Washinton DC, the following year in 1999.

In the previous chapter we presented the development of a European Union independent policy on defense which is the CFSP. In the same year of 1999, that document, the FCSP stated that NATO would still be responsible for the territorial defense of Europe and reconciliation. However, starting with the year 1999, the EU has its own responsibilities in terms of implementing missions such as those for peacekeeping and policing different treaties. It was in this period that the phrase "separable but not separate " came to describe the relationship between the two organizations. This was the core of deal made in the NATO Summit in Washington DC, based on witch the EU would increase its own military integration while still relaying on NATO as a partner.

Because of pressure from Turkey the agreement from the 1999 Summit was changed again and shifted towards a more Antlantist ideology where NATO would still hold a higher role in European defense and such the Berlin Plus agreement came to life in 2003. This documents represents the core today for what the framework of collaboration between NATO and EU is.

Since 2003 as we have presented in the previous chapter the European Union has moved forward to developing its own policies in terms of defense.

The conclusions of the CFSP and the directions that the EU wants to follow in terms of defense

were presented in 2016 to NATO in the NATO Warsaw Summit and it consisted of 42 proposals that the European Council had adopted in matters of security.

As a ongoing conclusion so far, just by analyzing how the CFSP has evolved from 1999 to 2016 we can observe the decrease of support that the EU wants from NATO and the increase in its own military integration. The process has become an evolutionary one, and in terms of the two ideologies with which we have started the chapter, it safe to say, that starting with the year 2015, the European Union is living in a Carolingian Ideology.

The problem is as we can see in Figure 2 that there are European countries that are part of the EU and not part of NATO and countries that are part of NATO and not part of the EU.


Fig. 2 EU and NATO member states
Source: https://creativecommons.org[1]

This situation has created challenges for both organizations and member states. For example, Denmark which is part of both organizations has opted to not sign the CSDP document and thus created a precedent inside the European Union, that has made EU leaders discuss about a multi-speed European Union where each country can decide for itself whether it wants to follow or not the general direction in which the European Union is heading towards.

A different situation is that of the EU member states that are not part of NATO. Out of the xi, five of them Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) have adopted a position of neutrality in terms of military conflicts. Even so, they are still undertaking peacekeeping operations under the

United Nations flag. For these countries being part of the CSDP is an important step in developing their security interests. For the EU these countries represent an opportunity to increase the share of resources and experience in the general pool of forces and capabilities that are going to be developed. The countries still keep their neutrality and thus the agreement is beneficial to all parties.

Such an example of collaboration is the Nordic Battle group, which shares 18 units to the EU and brings together support from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Ireland and Estonia. A good example of this is the Nordic battle group, one of 18 such units at the disposal of the EU, which brings together troops from Estonia, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Norway. This particular battle group is an interesting example of NATO-EU collaboration because there are countries that are member of both organizations like Ireland and Estonia, while others like Sweden and Finland are part of just the EU, while Norway is part just of NATO. Even though the battle group represents a capability of the EU, Norway has joined it under the Nordic flag, as the battle group implies common objectives for all member countries.

While the collaboration between NATO and EU remains inevitable there are different visions of how the EU should increase its defense integration even more to become not just a regional player, but also a global one.

3.2 The European Strategic Autonomy Concept. This concept has developed inside the EU as an idea ever since the CSDP has taken form starting with 2016. In order to develop security autonomy the EU would first of all have to establish its one operational headquarters. So far, member states have not managed to reach an understating on the matter so starting with 2020 for the time being only non-executive military mission HQ exist at the level of the European Union.

In order to achieve autonomy in terms of security the EU should develop one of the projects presented in the second chapter, that of PESCO. This agreement will allow the EU member states to invest more in developing their own military capabilities while using european defense industries at a higher level.

It is obvious that in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the EUGS, more modern military equipment is required and defense industries have to increase their role in the following years. For this the military capabilities of the EU also have to evolve and be transformed as the current level of ambition is a limited one and is

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[1] Since the review of this paper was completed, North Macedonia has also joined NATO

still related to the 1999 declaration of the members states that requires the European Union and its member states to be able to deploy and sustain 60.000 corps.

One of the major topics in terms of defense is that of defense spending. Following the PESCO initiative starting with 2018 the creation of a European Defense Fund started, a Fund that would require three steps in order to develop as it can be seen in Figure 3.


Fig. 3 The European Defense Fund.
Source: The European Commission

This European Defense Fund is co-financed by the European Commission which wants to support joint defense industrial projects while also investing in research programs for collaborative defense across the EU.

The fund is supposed to then be developed in two large steps. The first will mean allocating money for research with a share of €90 million until the end of 2019 and then €500 million per year after 2020. The second step will mean investments in Development & Acquisition with a share of €500 million in total for the 2019-20 timeframe and then a second share of up to €1 billion per year after 2020.

Again the question of duplicating efforts arises. When it comes to the NATO budget, it is known that the US is the major investor with almost 60% of the budget coming from their part. But data has shown that European countries who may same to contribute small share to the NATO budget, if they were to be added up as part of the EU, than the budget share for the entire EU as part of NATO would be more than 35% of the total budget.

Two ongoing conclusions could be developed so far. It is up to member states to understand if they can afford from an economic point of view this integration in terms of defense, which as PESCO shows will be an expensive one and

secondly the EU should act as one entity when negotiating with US inside of NATO. If the EU managed to negotiate de new initiatives of the CSDP in the Warsaw Treaty as a whole, it should be able to negotiate its own objectives inside of NATO, as it is as a whole the second largest contributor the NATO budget.

4. THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CHANGES

4.1 The EU as a global actor. In order to become a global actor, the EU has had to first and foremost become a regional player. As such efforts were made by the European Union to strengthen its activities in neighboring countries.

A first enlargement policy has meant an increased relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans. In terms of treaties and documents, the EU overlooked the signing of the Prespa Agreement reached by Athens and Skopje in June 2018.

It was also in the year 2018 that the European Commission presented a strategy gor an enhanced EU engagement inside the Western Balkans as well as enlargement initiatives for countries like Croatia that has since joined the EU and countries like Albania and North Macedonia that will be joining in the foreseeable future.

The strategy list a set of priorities and areas of cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan States, taking into consideration the specificity of the region and the fundamental challenges that the states from the area need to overcome in terms of reforms, economic growth, social conditions, neighborly relations, etc. Another region where the EU has strengthened its role is east to its current borders, in countries like the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.

Through the act known as the Eastern Partnership the EU has managed to invest in tarea and help train more than 20000 people, create more than 10000 jobs and offer financial supporter in more than 100000 loans to companies in these three states. The partnership also implies support in areas of governance, economy, social affairs and overall connectivity.

Another regional area of interest for the EU has been south of its current borders and a strong partnership has been created between the EU and countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria or Egypt. The partnership with these countries has included the promotion of democracy, rule of law, respect for human right, economic growth and social cohesion.

Besides these partnerships, the EU has also developed starting with the year 2016 a separate partnership with Tunisia, a country that has become the first Arab country in EU's Horizion 2020 Research and Innovation Programme.

The EU has also tried to assist Syria following a eight year conflict and war in the country and in the region. With funds up to 17 billion Euros allocated in humanitarian and development assistance starting with 2011, the EU has become one of the major contributors toe area. Eight year later, in 2019, the EU has renewed its support for Syria and the region by allocation funds up to 8 billion Euros for countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey that have received refugees from the Syrian war.

One key element that has come from the Syrian support has been that of support for the refugees and asylum seekers that have fled Syria and the region and have travelled to Europe in search of new homes. Due to the fact that opening borders for the refugees has also meant an increase of illegal immigration for population that is outside of the conflict area, this particular decision has created controversy and disruptions inside the EU. Although the EU has managed to become a regional player, immigration policies like the one mentioned and poor management of other crisis situation has also taken the EU a few steps back in its trajectory to becoming a Global Power. In the following subchapter we will analyze the drawbacks the EU has met in different fields and the consequences of some of the actions that the organization has taken over the years.

4.2 Immigration and other challenges for the EU. Since the three pillar system has been abandoned and the EU has integrated more then ever in terms of politics, economy, justice and security several threats and challenges have emerged globally.

Looking at global challenges that the EU desires to handle as a whole we can list a series of issues that have tested the capacity of the European Union to respond in the last decade. While they integrate fields larger than those of defense, it must be said that security represents a spectrum that comprises not just defense policies, put also social-political issues, economy and finance and even the judicial system.

One of the main challenges for member states following the Syrian war has been that of immigration and illegal immigration. This challenge of immigration has lead to an internal turmoil inside the EU that has rather divided the

organization that make it stronger. Euroscepticism has increased; The United Kingdom has left the EU after the Brexit vote, while countries that form the Visegrad group, like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have become opponents of many of the EU policies towards immigration.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has also increased uncertainty in the European project. The emergence of the Euro currency had left countries like Italy and Greece unprepared from a monetary point of view and the gap between these countries and the more economically powerful countries like Germany, France, Belgium and Holland was never closed.

The crisis determined a chain reaction that made Greece for example enter an unprecedented economic collapse from which is hasn't recovered fully even after ten years. This again has lead eurosceptics to argue that the EU is not ready to act as a whole, but rather countries are left to deal with situations of crisis on their own. A new recession is predicted for the time frame of 2020-2022, but with the outbreak of the corona-virus pandemic, at the beginning of 2020, analysts consider that the recession will turn into a financial crisis with deeper effects than the previous financial crisis of 2007-2009. If the European Union will respond as poorly as it did in that previous case, then again it will demonstrate that cohesion is still lacking, and that the organization cannot answer as a whole to major situations of risk and threats.

Speaking about the Corona-virus pandemic that has global effects, another crisis for the EU is that of its internal and external borders. One of the EU's main attributes, the Common Schengen space, that is presented in Figure 4 has been highly affected due to the pandemic. The crisis has meant the suspension of the Schengen agreement and the closure of member states borders. Countries are left to deal individually with the virus outbreak, while no financial support or medical aid is being sent from the EU specific body.

Observing the trouble that the EU has in all these fields, and that true cohesion had not been obtained, it is apparent that the EU has not reached the status of a global player. The EU remains a regional power and therefore analyzing the treaties that define a new military perspective for the European Union, it seems that autonomy in security is for the time being just a concept, not reality.

Furthermore we have to take into consideration that member states of the EU, that are situated on

the eastern flank have increased their defense expenditures as requested by the NATO Summit in Wales 2014, while building more capabilities for the NATO Defense Planning Process. This has happened starting with the year 2014, following the Crimean Crisis, due to the fact that countries like Romania, Poland, Estonia, Lituania, Latvia have a different assessment of risk and threats due to their geographic position, compared to the western member states.


Fig 4. Schengen and Eurozone members from the EU and NATO States. Source: visualcapitalist.com

Observing all these different scenarios will allow us to draw some conclusions on what role the EU can afford to take regionally and globally in the current of context of emerging challenges.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS AHEAD

While integrated defense has its advantages at an European level, especially if we consider the benefit of defense industries as part of the new European defense fund, it is the conclusion of this paper that the EU should not try and reach autonomy in terms of security. Rather the EU should follow its own example of how is has negotiated its position as a whole inside the World Trade Organization and has managed to obtain advantages for all member states. The same principle should be followed in matters of defense, as the EU would be better of at negotiating its own interest as a whole inside of NATO. Even if the principles of the CSDP have been presented during the Warsaw NATO Summit, EU member states have still negotiated their interests individually. One key step for the EU in negotiating as an entity rather than as separates states would be that of the allocation to NATO's budget. For this the EU should take into consideration the needs and desires of the countries than form the Eastern Flank of NATO, while also trying to balance budget allocation requests between PESCO and the NATO budget so as to not put too much pressure on the member states that in the end all have limited resources available for allocation.

After analyzing several documents, treaties and policies that the EU has developed in the past 30 years in terms of security and defense, the general conclusion of this paper is that the EU should not seek to become a global player in matters of security, but rather strengthen its transatlantic cooperation and become if possible a unified regional player inside the European continent. The efforts imposed in the Balkan region, East and South of the EU borders has shown the potential that the European Union has to play this role if not globally at least regionally with success.

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